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SCOPING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TRADE LAW AND 
INVESTMENT LAW REGIMES: WHEN DOES A MEASURE RELATE TO 
INVESTMENT? 
 
Arwel Davies* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The interaction between trade and investment dispute settlement proceedings has been 
described by investment tribunals and academic commentators as complex, and as at 
an infant stage. This article considers an aspect of this interaction; specifically the 
matter of how we should think about measures which are plainly capable of challenge 
in the trade regime and which also affect the economic interests of investors and their 
investments. The question is whether there is a compelling need to shift the review of 
such measures towards the trade regime, or whether such measures can be thought of 
as simply capable of challenge in both regimes. This article defends the second 
perspective.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The complementary nature of trade and investment as business activities is a well 
understood idea. Producers can choose to retain all their activities in the home state 
such that only goods and services cross a border. However, the desire to increase sales 
in foreign markets or lower production costs routinely involves the commitment of 
capital in these markets through the establishment of a commercial presence to fulfil 
functions such as distribution and marketing or manufacturing. This gives rise to 
‘intra-firm’ or ‘related-party’ trade under which companies trade to supply their 
affiliates abroad.1 In turn, these affiliates amount to investments in host states. Trade 
and investment are therefore depicted as existing in a ‘symbiotic and integrated 
relationship’ or as ‘two sides of the same coin’.2  
 
It follows from the nature of this relationship that measures clearly capable of 
challenge in the trade law regime are frequently in the cross-hairs of investors as 
potential breaches of the investment law regime. This overlap has been depicted as a 
matter of concern by reason of the differing characteristics of trade law and 
investment law dispute settlement. While intergovernmental trade disputes often have 
significant implications for national regulatory autonomy, this intrusiveness is 
counter-balanced by the manner in which trade law is enforced. Complaining states 
can be expected to exercise restraint in the initiation and conduct of proceedings 
                                                 
* School of Law, Swansea University. 
1 An OECD Economic Outlook gives an impression of the scale of intra-firm trade, reporting that it 
‘accounts for around one third of goods exports from Japan and the United States, and a similar 
proportion of all US goods imports and one-quarter of all Japanese goods imports’.  OECD Economic 
Outlook, Volume 2002 Issue 1, 163. 
2 WTO NEWS: 1996 PRESS RELEASES, PRESS 42,13 February 1996, Foreign direct investment 
seen as primary motor of globalization, says WTO Director-General, at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr042_e.htm>. 
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based on the balance between a successful outcome, and possible damage to 
diplomatic relations with respondent states. The ultimate remedy in the event of 
recalcitrance in bringing measures into conformity is the suspension of concessions so 
that any injury to private interests which occurred during the life-time of the 
inconsistent measures goes un-redressed.  
 
Dissatisfied with this position, private parties have brought actions before 
national and regional courts in search of stronger remedies such as the annulment of 
offending measures and damages. Across jurisdictions, courts have consistently 
declined to grant WTO law ‘direct effect’ so that these actions have been almost 
universally unsuccessful.3 While ‘indirect effect’ via principles of consistent 
interpretation has been upheld, this has not tended to result in executive branch 
agencies having to depart from their preferred understandings of domestic law and 
WTO law.4 These outcomes contribute towards state acceptance of the intrusion into 
regulatory autonomy which comes with WTO membership.   
 
In contrast, the manner in which modern investment law is enforced tends to 
exacerbate concerns about adjudication of the policy space available to governments. 
The foremost development from the traditional international law system of diplomatic 
protection has been termed the ‘individualization of claims’. As Van Harten writes, 
‘the claimant is no longer a publicly representative entity but a private party with full 
custody of the claim, who can decide the manner and extent to which international 
adjudication will be used to resolve a regulatory dispute’.5 The position of investors is 
reinforced by the ‘direct’ theory under which they are the holders of both procedural 
and substantive rights under investment treaties independently of their home states. 
This theory is contrasted with the ‘intermediate’ theory under which investors possess 
only a procedural right to trigger arbitration against the host state, while the 
substantive protections remain inter-state. The question of which theory should 
prevail continues to divide investment tribunals6 albeit that a preference for the 
intermediate theory is increasingly against the tide.7 These are among the 
                                                 
3 Claudio Dordi (ed) The Absence of Direct Effect of WTO in the EC and in Other Countries (Torino G. 
Giappichelli Editore, 2010).   
4 Giacomo Gattinara, ‘The Relevance of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions in the US Legal Order’ 
36(4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2009) 285 
5 Gus Van Harten, Investment Law Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 97. In similar terms, Douglas notes that, ‘the investor is guided in the prosecution of its 
claim solely by the dictates of self-interest without necessary regard for any consequences to the 
diplomatic relationship between its national state and the host state’. Zachary Douglas, The 
International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 18. 
6 Looking at the awards resulting from challenges against Mexico’s High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) 
tax and import permit requirement, the score is 2-1 in favour of the direct theory: Archer Daniels 
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc., v United Mexican States (ADM) 
(Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, 21 November 2007) – intermediate theory 
preferred at 123; Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 
Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, 18 September 2009) – direct theory preferred at 426; Corn Products 
International, Inc. v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/1, 15 January 2008) -direct theory preferred at 167.   
7 For a discussion of this issue, see Douglas, above note 3XX at 10-38. While noting divergences in the 
case law, the author (at 10) advances the following proposition as coming close to a codification: 
‘Where the contracting states to an investment treaty have agreed to a procedure for the judicial 
settlement of disputes between an investor and the host state, a claim advanced by the investor in 
accordance with such a procedure is its own claim and the national contracting state of the investor has 
no legal interest in respect thereof’. 
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considerations which have led commentators to identify ‘a paradigm shift in 
international investment law’.8   
 
The empowerment of private entities in the investment law regime has 
implications for the denial of direct effect of trade law. Measures which cannot be 
challenged by companies as trade law violations can nevertheless be challenged by 
investors as investment law violations. Of course, this does not mean that WTO 
obligations are granted direct effect before investment tribunals since the 
compatibility of the challenged measures with trade law obligations cannot be 
decisive in investment law disputes.9 Nevertheless, it can but help the investor’s case 
if the measures under consideration have previously been confirmed as trade law 
violations. The trade law adjudicatory findings will at least have a background 
relevance as interpretative context to the success of the claim, with investors likely to 
invoke Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this 
regard.10 This relevance will most obviously apply where measures previously 
confirmed as trade law national treatment violations, are then challenged under an 
investment law national treatment obligation. Verhoosel has also discussed whether a 
breach of WTO law could be used by an investor to establish a breach of the 
investment law fair and equitable treatment standard which requires treatment in 
accordance with international law, therefore including WTO law. As the author notes, 
this possibility means that the denial of direct effect of trade law ‘cannot be replicated 
to Bilateral Investment Treaty arbitrations without further qualification’.11   
 
 With these differences between the trade and investment law regimes in mind, 
how should we think about measures which affect both trade and investment? Is it 
necessary, as Afilalo argues, to think of these measures as residing in a grey area 
between the two regimes, and in terms of a need to shift the review of the measure 
from the investment regime to the trade regime?12 Alternatively, is it more appropriate 
to think about these measures as simply capable of review in both regimes? 
 
 These questions have been discussed in the case law and literature primarily 
with reference to a commonly occurring provision in free trade agreements with 
investment chapters and bilateral investment treaties. Under such provisions, 
                                                 
8 Stephan W. Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ 52(1) Virginia Journal of International 
Law (2011) 57 at 74. 
9 On this matter, the Cargill tribunal (above note XX at 193) noted as follows: ‘...although as Claimant 
suggests “like goods” or “like products” can be an important component of “like circumstances”, the 
fact that an investor is producing a good that is “like” a domestically produced good does not 
necessarily mean that the investor is in “like circumstances” with the domestic producer of that good. 
Thus, the fact that a WTO panel in Mexico-Tax on Soft Drinks concluded that cane sugar and HFCS are 
“directly competitive or substitutable” products is relevant but not determinative of whether the 
producers of these products are in “like circumstances” for the purposes of Article 1102.’  
10 This provides that, in the process of Treaty interpretation, ‘There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: ...(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’. 
11 Gaetan Verhoosel, ‘The Use of Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek 
Relief for Breaches of WTO Law’, 6(2) Journal of International Economic Law (2003) 493 at 496. 
12 In Afilalo’s words, there is a need to ‘shift the measures lying in the grey, “overlap” boundary 
between investment and trade in goods towards the realm of state-to-state litigation’. Ari Afilalo, 
‘Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA’s Investment 
Chapter’, 34(1) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2001) 1at 8. 
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government measures must relate to investment in order to be capable of challenge. 
This requirement has been considered as a jurisdictional issue in a number of 
investment cases, most frequently in the context of the NAFTA Article 1101 Scope 
and Coverage provision which specifies that the investment chapter ‘applies to 
measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to investors of another Party’ and 
their investments. The nature and extent of the required nexus has been a source of 
disagreement. Unsurprisingly, claimants have presented interpretations likely to 
advance their cases to the merits without significant impediment while respondent 
states have preferred interpretations more likely to end the challenge at the 
jurisdiction stage. In attempting to navigate between the different positions, 
investment tribunals have developed solutions to fit the circumstances of the cases 
before them. However, for various reasons, these solutions are not capable of general 
application so that a convincing and workable test has yet to be identified.   
 
This article contends that the only test capable of application in a clear and 
consistent manner, and without adverse consequences, is that advanced by claimants. 
Under this test, there is a sufficient nexus when measures affect the economic 
interests of the investment. As such, and contrary to Afilalo’s position, there is no 
compelling need to bestow the ‘relating to’ requirement with the task of 
distinguishing between government measures which should be reviewed (if at all) in 
the trade law regime, and measures which might also (or alternatively) be reviewed as 
possible violations of the investment law regime. On the contrary, the appraisal of 
measures which affect an investment can safely proceed to the merits.13  
 
The analysis begins in Section II with a commonly advanced approach 
towards the ‘relating to’ requirement. Respondent states have argued that measures do 
not relate to investment if they are capable of challenge under the trade in goods or 
services chapters. Tribunals have correctly rejected this approach. However, they 
have done so in an equivocal and cryptic manner. The section offers a view on what a 
more complete analysis might look like with reference to NAFTA provisions of 
relevance to the relationship between different Chapters. Of course, dismissing an 
argument about when measures do not relate to investment creates the need for a 
positive test to reveal when measures do so relate. Section III begins to appraise the 
prevailing test which requires a ‘legally significant connection’ between the measures 
and the investment. With some reluctance, the recent Cargill14 tribunal used this test 
and considered that it was satisfied. However, based on the tribunal’s brief statements, 
it cannot be accepted that a generally applicable approach (as opposed to one which 
worked in the case at hand) was identified.  
 
Section IV considers the earlier Methanex15 case from which the idea of 
‘relating to’ as ‘legally significant connection’ originates. The section is critical of 
this tribunal’s rationale for the ‘legally significant connection’ test as responding to 
the need for a ‘practical limitation’ on the volume of claims. Also criticized are the 
tribunal’s attempts to develop a workable conception of the test.  Indeed, there is a 
                                                 
13 This comment is made subject to the fulfilment of other jurisdictional requirements which have been 
considered at length in the standard works such as Douglas above note XX.  
14 Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican States above note XX. 
15 Methanex Corp. v U.S.A (Final Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits) NAFTA / UNCITRAL. See, 
Todd Weiler, ‘Methanex Corp. v U.S.A. Turning the Page on NAFTA Chapter 11?’ 6 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade (2005) 903. 
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sense that the tribunal, having apparently settled on one conception, later realized that 
it would need to settle on an alternative conception. This shift at least enabled the 
tribunal to avoid a problem of ‘fit and compatibility’ in terms of ensuring that its 
jurisdiction test was no stricter than standards encountered in the merits. However, the 
tribunal’s eventual understanding of the ‘legally significant connection’ test failed on 
its own terms. This understanding does not control claims any more than a test based 
on mere adverse impact on the investment.  
 
Section V questions whether there might be an alternative and more workable 
conception of ‘relating to’ as ‘legally significant connection’. With reference to 
analogies with WTO law, it is argued that all possible conceptions of the test blur the 
boundary between the jurisdiction and merits analyses. Section VI questions whether 
there is any compelling reason for thinking about the ‘relating to’ standard as 
requiring something more than adverse impact. Certainly, if it were not possible to 
consider regulatory purpose within the merits analysis, the ‘relating to’ standard 
would need to have a strong role in preventing the incursion of the investment law 
regime into the public regulatory sphere. However, there would appear to be ample 
scope for such consideration within the merits analysis. Section VII concludes.           
 
II. MEASURES DO NOT RELATE TO INVESTMENT IF CAPABLE OF 
CHALLENGE UNDER OTHER CHAPTERS 
 
Respondent states have sometimes argued that measures should not be reviewed 
under Chapter 11 if they could alternatively be analysed as possible violations of 
other chapters. Under this argument, the possibility of review under a non-investment 
Chapter means that the measure does not relate to investment thereby depriving an 
investor-state tribunal of jurisdiction. 
 
The argument was most recently aired in the Cargill case which illustrates the 
overlap between the trade law and investment law regimes as well as the 
complementary nature of trade and investment as business activities. The subject 
matter was closely connected with a long-running trade dispute between the US and 
Mexico beginning with a successful challenge at the WTO of Mexican anti-dumping 
duties imposed on high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the US.16 The eventual 
withdrawal of these duties was followed by a 20% tax on soft drinks containing a 
sweetener other than cane sugar, which was therefore applicable to HFCS. This tax 
was again successfully challenged by the US as a GATT Article III national treatment 
violation.17 The same tax, along with an import permit requirement, for which 
published details on eligibility and application procedures were not available, was 
also at the heart of the Cargill case. The claimant was an American food company 
with a subsidiary in Mexico employing over a thousand people in ten Mexican cities. 
The business of the subsidiary was to sell HFCS imported from its parent company in 
the US. This activity was severely affected by the tax and import permit requirement 
to the extent that all HFCS orders by Mexican bottling plants were cancelled.18 The 
claimant alleged a number of NAFTA Chapter 11 violations. These were confirmed, 
                                                 
16 WT/DS132/R, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation on High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United 
States, adopted 24 February 2000. 
17 WT/DS308/AB/R, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, adopted 24 March 
2006. 
18 Cargill above note XX at 107. 
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and damages of $77,329,249 were awarded in a report released to the parties some 
three years after the adoption of the WTO Appellate Body report which had addressed 
the tax. In terms of the nature of the measures at issue as affecting both trade and 
investment, the case is entirely typical and representative.19    
 
It is immediately obvious that the measures at issue could be reviewed in 
inter-governmental dispute settlement under NAFTA Chapter 20 as possible 
violations of Chapter 3 on National Treatment and Market Access for goods. 
Complainant states also have the alternative of WTO dispute settlement by virtue of 
NAFTA Article 2005. As noted, this option had already been exercised by the United 
States through the successful challenged of the tax as a GATT Article III national 
treatment violation. Clearly, therefore, it is possible to think of the measures at issue 
as trade related, and even primarily trade related given that the measures address the 
movement of goods across a border and the conditions of internal sale. The question 
is whether this possibility precludes or trumps the possibility of also thinking about 
the measures as investment related. 
 
Echoing views expressed by respondent states in earlier cases, Mexico’s 
contention  was that ‘any harm resulting from a measure related to trade in goods can 
only be the subject of a claim between the States concerned pursuant to the Chapter 
20 dispute resolution process and would not fall within Chapter 11’.20 This contention 
places the trade and investment chapters, together with their respective dispute 
settlement methods, in a hierarchical and mutually exclusive relationship and raises 
the question of whether there is any evidence of such a relationship in the treaty text. 
On this matter, the tribunal found as follows: 
 
The fact that trade in goods/services and investment are dealt with in 
separate Chapters of the NAFTA does not ipso facto mean that there can be 
no overlap between the two. It is true that Article 1112(1) of the NAFTA 
provides that ‘in the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and 
another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency’. However, the primacy of the non-investment Chapters only 
applies in the event of an inconsistency and an overlap is not necessarily an 
inconsistency.21 
 
The tribunal here offers a limited view of the Article 1112(1) ‘conflict clause’. A 
fuller appraisal of the provision is offered below.    
  
A. Appraising the Article 1112(1) ‘conflict’ clause 
 
The basic argument here is that Article 1112(1) cannot be understood as precluding 
the review of measures under the investment Chapter on the basis that they could be 
reviewed under a non-investment Chapter. It can therefore be contrasted with another 
NAFTA provisions (Article 1901(3)) which operates in exactly this manner. 
 
                                                 
19 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: the WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti Bowl” 
is Cooking’ 9(1) Journal of International Economic Law (2006) 197 at 199-200. 
20 Cargill above note XX at 143. 
21 Ibid. At 148. 
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Article 1112(1), and identical provisions in FTAs with investment chapters,22 
have yet to be subject to a detailed review in the jurisprudence. The provision was 
briefly considered by the Canfor23 tribunal in its examination of an aspect of the trade 
law / investment law boundary; specifically the relationship between Chapter 19 
review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations,24 and Chapter 11 
investor-state arbitration. The question was whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to 
decide on Chapter 11 claims to the extent that they encompassed matters clearly 
falling under the coverage of Chapter 19. For reasons which can be deferred for the 
moment, the tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction. However, it did not 
agree with all the arguments invoked by the United States to support the lack of 
jurisdiction. In particular, the tribunal considered that Article 1112(1) did not 
strengthen the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
In rejecting the reliance on Article 1112(1), the tribunal cited Canada’s 
Statement of Implementation which provides that the provision ‘...ensures that the 
specific provisions of other chapters are not superseded by the general provisions of 
this [the investment] chapter’.25 This view of Article 1112(1) as a lex specialis 
principle was cited by the Canfor tribunal as supporting its assessment of the 
provision: 
 
The language of Article 1112(1) ... is limited to ‘any inconsistencies’. 
That limitation appears to be confined to differences in text, possibly as 
interpreted, and not to decisions resulting from dispute resolution 
mechanisms contemplated by those texts.26 
 
Therefore, the suggestion is that Article 1112(1) operates at the level of irreconcilable 
differences between the texts of the non-investment and investment chapters, rather 
than at the level of differences in decisions emanating from different dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  
 
 This interpretation gives effect to the argument of this section – Chapter 11 
review is not precluded by the possibility of review under another Chapter. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation may well be a misunderstanding of the provision. This 
is because there is no clear distinction between, on the one hand, textual differences 
and, on the other hand, differences in decisions emanating from different dispute 
mechanisms. If a measure violates the investment chapter, but not other chapters 
under which it might also be challenged, this can only be because of textual 
differences, or differences in the interpretation of the same legal terms. The Canfor 
tribunal’s interpretation does not therefore provide a basis for dismissing the 
application of Article 1112(1) at the level of inconsistent decisions. Indeed, there is no 
                                                 
22 The provision is replicated, for example, in the following FTAs: US – Singapore, Article 15.3.1; US 
– Chile, Article 10.1.2; US – Dominican Republic - CAFTA, Article 10.2). 
23 Canfor Corporation, Terminal Forest products Ltd v U.S.A.  (Decision on Preliminary Question) 
NAFTA / UNCITRAL, 6 June 2006. 
24 Among the NAFTA Parties, these binational panels replace national judicial review of final 
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations and decide on the compatibility of agency 
determinations with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing party. NAFTA, 
Article 1904(1)(2). 
25 Department of External Affairs, North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Statement of 
Implementation, in Canada Gazette 68 (1 January 1994), p. 152. 
26 Canfor above note XX at 228. 
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reason to be uncomfortable about the provision operating at this level, provided the 
correct manner of operation is understood.  
 
In understanding the provision’s role at the level of inconsistent decisions, the 
key point is that it is difficult to know for sure whether there is an ‘inconsistency’ 
between Chapters to which Article 1112(1) could attach until the decision of the 
investment tribunal is known. Prior to this, inconsistencies are merely possible as 
opposed to established, at least when (as will usually be the position) the relevant 
norms are to any extent open to interpretation. Therefore, the provision cannot be 
interpreted as insulating measures from review on the basis of the possibility or 
actuality of review under a non-investment Chapter. Rather, the provision is correctly 
understood as operating at the conclusion of investment disputes in the event of a 
decision which impugns state conduct clearly or required by another Chapter. 
 
An example of how a provision such as Article 1112(1) might operate can be 
found in one of Pauwelyn’s shorter contributions. He refers to a non-investment 
feature of the US – Singapore FTA which envisaging state-to-state proceedings to 
force parties to implement their labor and environmental laws, subject to monetary 
damages.27 He notes that ‘[t]his could theoretically lead to the following odd result: 
one arbitration panel may condemn a party for failure to enforce its environmental or 
labor law, while another investment tribunal under the same FTA might find that this 
very same law violates the investment provisions of the FTA’.28 This is seen as a 
possible scenario in which the ‘conflict clause’ might operate. A fuller treatment can 
be found in the author’s monograph with the example above falling within the scope 
of a ‘conflict in the applicable law’. The essential question here is whether the 
exercise of rights or compliance with one norm [in casu the non-investment norm] 
breaches an obligation under another norm [the investment norm]. In this situation, 
there is a conflict or inconsistency which needs to be resolved in some way.29 
Suppose that the challenged measures in the investment dispute are the labor and 
environmental laws as well as their dutiful enforcement. The situation here is posited 
as follows: ‘a state has acted in a certain way, two norms apply to the act in question, 
under one norm the act is “illegal”, under the other it is not; which one of the two 
norms must be applied?’ Article 1112(1) provides the answer here; the non-
investment norm would prevail or, in Pauwelyn’s terms, ‘the state in question made 
the right choice and it incurs no responsibility’.30 Reliance on these extracts clearly 
does not provide a complete account of the provision’s possible scope of operation. 
However, the example is enough to demonstrate the operation of the provision at the 
end of the investment dispute rather than to prevent the case from proceedings to the 
merits. It is simply not possible to know whether there is any inconsistency which 
could activate Article 1112(1) until the investment law norms have been interpreted.  
 
This analysis has implications for the advice which should be provided to 
investors in terms of avoiding the cost of litigation which cannot generate a positive 
outcome. If the very same measure of concern to the investor has already been 
unsuccessfully challenged under a non-investment Chapter, it is arguable that this 
                                                 
27 The possibility of an ‘annual monetary assessment’ is provided for by Article 20.7. 
28 Pauwelyn, above note XX at 200.  
29 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 177. 
30 Ibid. 276 
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measure ought not to give rise to state responsibility under Chapter 11. Is it 
appropriate to suggest a distinction here? The statement would have to be correct if 
the challenged measure was something expressly required or permitted by another 
Chapter. But what if the measure is not within this description but rather is just 
something which does not violate another Chapter? Here, I think there would be 
scope for arguing that state responsibility could ensue if the measure is found to 
violate the investment Chapter. This would be on the basis that the investment 
Chapter protects different values which in turn means that the measure is reviewed 
from a different angle under this Chapter. Article 1112(1) would prevent this 
outcome.31 The best advice might therefore be to refrain from a Chapter 11 challenge. 
It could then be argued that, in the event of a challenge, the investment tribunal 
should bring the dispute to an end at the jurisdiction stage on the basis that, even if a 
violation were established, state responsibility could not ensue. It is submitted 
however that this arguendo approach would not be valid since it relies on Article 
1112(1) before it is known whether it is activated by an established conflict. 
Therefore, there is a difference between the content of practical advice, and the duty 
of the investment tribunal to adjudicate on the matters before it should this advice not 
be heeded.  
 
On this matter, the ‘inconsistency’ which can trigger Article 1112(1) can be 
expected to be rare. Measures which are capable of review in both regimes tend either 
to be compliant or non-compliant with both regimes so that there will not routinely be 
differing and inconsistent decisions. The avoidance of inconsistency is assisted by the 
standard technique of interpretation set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
under which Treaty terms must be interpreted ‘in their context’. While the example 
above illustrates how a provision such as Article 1112(1) could operate, it is also 
possible that it would not be required. The US – Singapore FTA sets out the 
acknowledgement of the parties that ‘it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic Lobor [and 
environmental] laws’.32 These provisions would be undermined if positive 
enforcement of these domestic laws led to a violation of the investment chapter, and it 
can be expected that investment tribunals would take account of these provisions as 
interpretive context. 
 
B. The implications of the Canfor ruling 
 
It is important to return to Canfor as some of the tribunal’s statements and reasoning 
are contrary to the analysis presented above. As noted, the tribunal rejected Article 
1112(1) as supporting the view that matters covered by Chapter 19 cannot be 
reviewed under Chapter 11. However, it proceeded to find a clear demarcation 
between the Chapters and, therefore, declined jurisdiction. The tribunal considered 
that, ‘…when it comes to NAFTA’s mechanisms for dispute settlement, it cannot be 
presumed that the drafters intended to create an open-ended, multiple fora system’,33 
and that ‘…the presumption of the NAFTA is that, in the absence of an express 
                                                 
31 A good example here would be a measure challenged in the trade regime as a possible GATT Article 
III national treatment violation which is justified under Article XX. The measure is then challenged 
under NAFTA Chapter 11 as a possible national treatment violation. Even if the investment tribunal 
confirmed a violation, state responsibility ought not to ensue by reason of Article 1112(1).  
32 Articles 17.2.2. and 18.2.2. 
33 Canfor above note XX at 241. 
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provision to the contrary, concurrent or parallel proceedings are to be avoided’.34 The 
tribunal conceded that proceedings under Chapters 19 and 11 have a ‘different object’ 
with Chapter 19 panels applying domestic law and Chapter 11 tribunals applying 
international law.35 However, it attributed more weight to the fact that the measures 
before it were clearly within the scope of Chapter 19. The two sets of proceedings 
were therefore viewed as ‘…concurrent or parallel … even though the applicable law 
and available remedies differ’.36 
 
Understood as general statements, which could also be applied to the 
relationship between the investment and goods and services chapters, I am inclined to 
disagree with the tribunal’s views. NAFTA negotiators would have understood the 
inseparable nature of trade and investment as business activities. In turn, they would 
have foreseen the high propensity of measures capable of review in the trade regime 
to impact upon investors and their investments. Had they intended to insulate such 
measures from review in the investment regime, this would have been explicitly 
provided for, or, at least a reasonably strong indication of this position would have 
been provided. On the other hand, the Canfor tribunal’s position becomes easier to 
accept if viewed as restricted to the relationship between Chapters 19 and 11. Indeed, 
it is quite straightforward to so restrict the tribunal’s position.   
 
The exact issue before the tribunal was the correct interpretation of Article 
1901(3) which, like Article 1112(1), is relevant to the relationship between different 
NAFTA Chapters. It provides that ‘…no provision of any other Chapter of this 
Agreement shall be construed as imposing obligations on a Party with respect to the 
Party's antidumping law or countervailing duty law’. This provision seems to clearly 
require that the review of these laws be retained within Chapter 19. Review under any 
other chapter would impose obligations on a Party contrary to the provision’s 
language. This statement is self-evidently correct in the event of a successful outcome 
for the claimant under Chapter 11. In addition, the natural tendency of governments to 
defend Chapter 11 claims can be regarded as imposing an obligation regardless of the 
outcome. If this can be accepted as a plausible ‘ordinary meaning’ of the provision, 
the tribunal’s presumption is arguably the wrong way round. Why would Article 
1901(3) be required if there is a generally applicable presumption that concurrent or 
parallel proceedings are to be avoided unless expressly envisaged? The inclusion of 
the provision is more consistent with the accommodation of concurrent proceedings 
unless excluded. 
 
Such a presumption in favour of concurrent proceedings is also consistent with 
the approach of other Chapter 11 tribunals. When confronted with the argument that a 
Chapter 11 claim was prevented by the possibility of review under the goods or 
services chapters, the Myers37 tribunal drew inspiration from the approach of WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body under which, ‘WTO obligations are generally 
cumulative [so that] Members must comply with all of them simultaneously unless 
                                                 
34 Ibid. at 242. 
35 Ibid. at 245. 
36 Ibid. at 246. 
37 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada (First Partial Award) NAFTA / UNCITRAL, 13 
November 2000.  
 11 
there is a formal “conflict” between them’.38 The Myers tribunal relied on this notion 
of cumulative obligations when discussing the relationship between Chapters 11 and 
12 (services). It considered that the ‘...grant of a right generally does not take away 
other rights unless they are mutually exclusive, or the grant is stated expressly to 
abrogate another right’.39 Therefore, the right of the NAFTA state Parties to challenge 
measures as breaches of the services Chapter, did not take away the right of investors 
to challenge them as breaches of the investment Chapter. The rights are not mutually 
exclusive and there is no provision which abrogates one right in favour of another. 
 
The difference in Canfor is that Chapter 19 can be viewed as granting a right 
which abrogates rights under Chapter 11. Article 1904 grants private entities whose 
goods are subject to final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations the 
right to request panel review of these determinations for conformity with the 
importing Party’s laws. By virtue of Article 1901(3), the grant of this right can be 
seen as abrogating any rights under Chapter 11 is so far as it might otherwise extend 
to the review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. The key point is 
that this abrogation occurs by virtue of Article 1901(3). Therefore, there was no need 
for the Canfor tribunal to invoke a generally applicable presumption against 
concurrent proceedings. On the contrary, Article 1901(3) could have been presented 
as a provision whose ordinary meaning rebuts a presumption of cumulative 
application.   
 
C. From a more theoretical perspective 
 
It can also be argued that the possibility of concurrent review must generally be 
accommodated when the same measure is reviewed for compatibility with two sets of 
rules which have different objectives, and which protect different values.   
 
On these differences, DiMascio and Pauwelyn see the trade regime as about 
enhancing ‘overall welfare’ and ‘efficiency’ by focusing on the macro-issues of 
‘liberalizing trade flows through the reciprocal exchange of market access 
concessions between governments’. In contrast, the investment regime is more about 
the ‘micro issues of attracting and protecting investments made by individual 
investors’ with a view to the accelerated economic development of the host state.40 
The values pursued by the trade law regime are generally thought to be sufficiently 
protected by an inter-governmental system of dispute settlement which is directed 
towards the prospective removal of the offending measure on pain of suffering a 
suspension of concessions. In contrast, attracting foreign investors in order to enhance 
economic development is thought to be facilitated by the availability of investor-state 
arbitration and compensation to address the economic harm caused by offending 
measures. While both dispute settlement processes correspond well with the 
                                                 
38 WT/DS98/R, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, adopted 
12 January 2000, para. 7.38, cited by the Myers tribunal at 291. 
39 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada (Second Partial Award) NAFTA / UNCITRAL, 21 
October 2002, at 132. 
40 Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin’ 102 American Journal of International Law (2008) 48 at 
53-56. 
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underlying objectives and values of each regime, neither sufficiently protects the 
totality of these objectives and values.41 
 
This idea can be used in support, not only of concurrent review, but also of the 
validity of the decisions generated by the two review processes – even if the 
investment decision impugns a measure found not to infringe the trade rules. After all, 
if the same measure is assessed for compatibility with two sets of different rules, then 
different but equally valid outcomes ought to be a legal possibility, just as when the 
same misconduct is contemporaneously or sequentially reviewed as a possible crime 
and as a possible tort. However, there is an important caveat here related to the 
previous two subsections. The validity of different and inconsistent decisions under 
different NAFTA Chapters must be considered in light of Treaty provisions directed 
towards this situation. As has been argued, in the event of a Chapter 11 decision being 
at odds with a decision under a non-investment Chapter by reason of a conflict of 
norms, no state responsibility ought to follow from the investment decision.42    
 
Drawing together the threads of the Section II discussion, the conclusion is 
that the preclusive effect of any particular provision in terms of concurrent review, 
depends on the terms of the clause in question. While Article 1112(1) can operate at 
the level of inconsistent decisions, it cannot be known whether the decision of the 
investment tribunal is inconsistent with a non-investment right or obligation until this 
decision is rendered. It is therefore difficult to understand the provision as precluding 
Chapter 11 review on the basis of the possibility of review under another Chapter. In 
contrast, Article 1901(3) is an example of a clause whose plain language prevents the 
review of matters within the scope of Chapter 19 under any other Chapter. Overall, 
there is little support for a general proposition that trade related measures cannot also 
relate to investment for the purposes of Article 1101.  
 
III. BUT WHEN DOES A MEASURE RELATE TO INVESTMENT? 
 
The analysis above dismisses a possible objection to establishing the required nexus 
between the measure and the investment. Measures are not precluded from ‘relating 
                                                 
41 Diebold has recently offered some views on the implications of the different emphases of the trade 
and investment regimes for interpreting the respective non-discrimination obligations. He considers it 
‘...not entirely apparent ... why arguably different objects of protection in investment and trade law ... 
should also explain different substantive standards of non-discrimination obligations’. To the extent 
that Diebold argues that the non-discrimination obligations should sometimes be interpreted in the 
same way, this supports the first argument at the end of Section II:A. Measures which are capable of 
review in both regimes tend either to be compliant or non-compliant with both regimes so that there 
will not very often be different / inconsistent outcomes. Nicolas F Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-
Discrimination in International Economic Law’ 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2011) 831, 844-845.  
42 I do not present this as the only possible perspective. Indeed, it could be argued that there cannot be a 
conflict of norms and resulting inconsistent decisions as between the trade and investment Chapters 
which would activate Article 1112(1). Conflict of norms is generally discussed in an inter-state setting. 
This raises the question of the extent to which conflict principles carry over when the state obligation 
breached is owed, not to another state, but (at least under the prevailing view) directly to investors. 
Why should compliance with a norm in an inter-state system mean that state responsibility cannot 
ensue from non-compliance with a norm in an investor-state system? For this article, my only response 
is that Article 1112(1) must have some scope of operation. It is difficult to see what this scope might be 
if not that depicted in the main text.  
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to’ investment because they deal with trade in goods.43 This position does not 
positively answer the question of when the nexus requirement is satisfied, or what the 
test might be.  
 
 The Cargill tribunal’s subsequent engagement with the positive meaning of 
the ‘relating to’ standard appears to begin promisingly with the finding that the import 
permit requirement ‘affected Claimant’s investment in Mexico’.44 Unfortunately, 
however, the tribunal proceeds to clarify that this finding did not pertain to the 
‘relating to’ standard, and that a further test was required: 
 
Article 1101 has a causal connection requirement as well: the measures 
adopted or maintained by Respondent must be those “relating to” investors 
of another Party or investments of investors of another Party. The tribunal 
in Methanex Corp. v. United States explored is some details the 
requirement of “relating to”. In paragraph 147 of its Partial Award, the 
Methanex tribunal determined that the phrase “relating to” signifies 
“something more than the mere effect of a measure on an investor or an 
investment and that it requires a legally significant connection between 
them.” 
 
Regardless of whether or not the test espoused in Methanex is too 
restrictive, it is satisfied in this case. The import permit requirement not 
only had an immediate and direct effect on the business of Cargill de 
Mexico but also constituted a legal impediment to carrying on the business 
of Cargill de Mexico in sourcing HFCS in the United States and re-selling 
it in Mexico.45 
 
In this passage, some unease is expressed about the ‘legally significant connection’ 
test as possibly being too restrictive. However, the test was satisfied because the 
measure ‘constituted a legal impediment’ to the claimant’s business. The core idea 
here is that there is a difference between a measure which merely affects an 
investment, or which has ‘an immediate and direct effect’ on an investment, and a 
measure which legally impedes an investment. However, it is difficult to see what this 
difference might be. When will a government measure which merely affects an 
investment ever not also legally impede an investment?  
 
The only suggestion which comes to mind is that the form of the measure is 
relevant. In other words, there will be a legal impediment when the measure takes the 
form of a ‘law’ and probably also a ‘regulation’, but not a ‘procedure, requirement or 
practice’.46 If this is what the tribunal had in mind, then it can be taken to have 
concluded that there was a legal impediment because the import permit requirement 
was in the form of a decree.47 However, the most that can be accepted is that a 
solution was found to fit the circumstances of the case at hand, rather than that a 
                                                 
43 In the Cargill tribunal’s words, ‘there is no express or implied presumption that measures dealing 
with goods cannot ipso facto be alleged to be measures “relating to” investors or investments per 
Article 1101’. Above note XX at 153. 
44 Ibid. at 173. 
45 Ibid. at 174-175. 
46 NAFTA Article 201 defines ‘measure’ using these familiar terms. 
47 Cargill above note XX at 117. 
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workable general test was identified. The protection afforded to investors cannot 
depend on the form of the government measure at issue.48 It must therefore be 
possible to satisfy the ‘relating to’ requirement regardless of the form of the measure. 
This brings us back to the question of what the requirement can mean if it is 
interpreted as something different from mere effect. The Cargill tribunal referenced 
the ‘legally significant connection’ test from Methanex but failed to identify a 
workable elaboration of this test. The discussion now turns to whether the Methanex 
tribunal had fared any better.        
      
IV. THE METHANEX TEST: ‘RELATING TO’ AS LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT 
CONNECTION 
 
In common with Cargill, the Methanex case also involved a measure plainly capable 
of review in inter-governmental dispute settlement as a possible violation of the 
NAFTA trade in goods Chapter. At issue was a Californian ban on the sale of gasoline 
containing methyl tertiaty-butyl ether (MTBE). This was based on the environmental 
risks posed by this oxygenate as demonstrated by a previously commissioned study by 
the University of California. The ban was challenged under Chapter 11 by Methanex, 
a Canadian firm with facilities in the US and several other countries. Methanex 
specialized in the production, marketing and transportation of methanol – a liquid 
petrochemical used to produce MTBE. It considered that the ban was ‘a disguised 
trade and investment restriction intended to achieve the improper goal of protecting 
and advantaging the domestic ethanol industry through sham environmental 
regulations disadvantaging MTBE and methanol’.49 Methanex claimed compensation 
of US$ 970 million. 
 
On the Article 1101 ‘relating to’ requirement, the US (with Canada and 
Mexico in agreement) argued for a ‘legally significant connection’ between the 
disputed measure and the investment. In advancing this test, it is interesting to note 
that the concern was as previously identified by Afilalo in the literature. According to 
the US, there was a need to prevent the incursion of the investment regime into the 
public regulatory sphere. The ‘legally significant connection’ test would prevent 
measures designed to protect human health or the environment from being treated as 
‘relating to’ an investor or investment merely by reason of an ‘incidental impact’.50 
Methanex in contrast, at least initially, advanced the looser connection that the 
measures should ‘affect’ the investor or its investment.  
 
A. Legally significant connection as a response to the need for a ‘practical 
limitation’ 
                                                 
48 Other tribunals applying NAFTA Chapter 11 have referred to the breadth of the Article 201 
definition of measure. For example, the Ethyl tribunal noted that, ‘Clearly something other than a law, 
even something in the nature of a practice, which may not even amount to a legal stricture may qualify’ 
(para. 66). Ethyl Corporation v The Government of Canada (Award on jurisdiction) NAFTA / 
UNCITRAL, 24 June 1998 at 66.The Loewen tribunal noted that, ‘The breadth of this inclusive 
definition, notably the references to “law, procedure, requirement or practice”, is inconsistent with the 
notion that judicial action is an exclusion from the generality of the expression 'measures’. (para. 40)  
The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v U.S.A. (Decision on hearing of Respondent's 
objection to competence and jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 5 
January 2001) at 40. 
49 Methanex Corp. v U.S.A. (First Partial Award) NAFTA / UNCITRAL, 7 August 2002 at 46. 
50 Ibid. at 130. 
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The tribunal favoured the ‘legally significant connection’ test. However, its rationale 
was not explicitly based on any need to prevent the incursion of the investment law 
regime into the public regulatory sphere. Rather, the tribunal considered that the 
‘affecting’ standard, ‘…imposes no practical limitation; and an interpretation 
imposing a limit is required to give effect to the object and purpose of Chapter 11’.51 
Therefore, in the case at hand, ‘…the affecting standard could be met by suppliers to 
Methanex who suffered as a result of Methanex’s alleged losses, suppliers to those 
suppliers and so on, towards infinity’.52  
 
This explanation for favouring the stricter test can be depicted as insufficiently 
contextual. Regardless of how the ‘relating to’ standard is interpreted, it is first 
necessary to know whether there is an investor or investment, and this aspect of 
Article 1101 has a role in controlling the volume of claims and the over-reach of 
investment law into the trade sphere. On the journey from Methanex towards infinity, 
it can be questioned how often along the supply chain one might expect to encounter 
firms mainly serving their home markets and perhaps engaging also in purely 
international trade related activities – firms which, in other words, would not be able 
to show the existence of an investment under Article 1101.  
 
Typologies of treaty definitions of investment give the impression of the 
breadth and uncertain scope of this concept.53 While there is a significant measure of 
convergence in the definitions, there are also textual differences so that 
generalizations about whether assets arising from any specific activity or transaction 
amounts to an investment must be treated with some caution. However, it is a 
reasonable generalization that assets arising from transaction where only goods cross 
a border, as opposed to also services and capital, are outside the definition of 
investment in most treaties.54 The usual assets in this context are either the seller’s 
right to payment, or possible damages claims by the buyer or seller for breach of 
contract. Such assets typically fall outside positive treaty definitions of investment. 
They also fall under a fairly common express exclusion such as that found in NAFTA 
1139 which excludes ‘claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for 
the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an 
enterprise in the territory of another Party’.55 
                                                 
51 Ibid. at 139. 
52 Ibid. at 137. 
53 See, Jedwald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
158-166. 
54 The reference to ‘most treaties’ is deliberate as the definition of investment in some BITs call into 
question the claim that assets arising from transaction where only goods cross a border are outside the 
definition of investment. For example Article 1 of the UK-Egypt BIT defines investment as including 
‘every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: … (iii) claims to money or to 
any performance under contract having a financial value’. 
55 There is much more that could be written about the definition of investment in terms of limiting the 
extent to which assets arising from ordinary commercial contracts qualify as investments. Of 
significance here is the relationship between the treaty definition in question and Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention which extends the jurisdiction of the Centre to ‘any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment’.  While the term ‘investment’ in Article 25 is left undefined, a number of criteria 
have been established and applied in the ICSID jurisprudence. As stated by the tribunal in Bayindir, 
these overlapping criteria comprise ‘a contribution [in the sense of a substantial commitment on the 
part of the investor]; a certain duration over which the project is implemented; sharing of the 
operational risks, and a contribution to the host State’s development’. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret 
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Thus if we change the facts of Methanex and imagine the absence of the 
company’s activities in the US, leaving only Methanex in its home market (Canada) 
exporting methanol to the US, there would have been no investment.56 The economic 
interests of Methanex in the US would still have been severely affected by the 
Californian MTBE ban, but challenges against the ban could only then have occurred 
in the domain of intergovernmental trade law dispute settlement. To the extent that 
US firms might have responded to the ban by breaching supply contracts with 
Methanex, the assets in the form of possible damages actions would not fall within the 
definition of investment and could only, therefore, be subject to a private law dispute.  
 
It follows that the need to show the existence of an investment under Article 
1101 presents an initial hurdle to jurisdiction independently of the ‘relating to’ 
language. Both Cargill and Methanex clearly had investments in their host states. 
However, producers are not always investors any more than their suppliers are always 
investors.     
 
It is also sometimes overlooked that success at the jurisdiction phase does not 
eliminate the formidable challenges likely to be encountered in the mertis – 
challenges which will surely deter claims even if the ‘relating to’ language is liberally 
interpreted.57 In sum, the extent of the ‘gate keeping’ function which the ‘relating to’ 
standard needs to have depends on the ease with which the claimant arrived at the 
gate, and what they are likely to encounter beyond it.  
 
B. The decision to combine the jurisdiction and merits decisions 
 
                                                                                                                                            
ve Sanayi A.Ş. v Islamamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 
Case No. ARB/03/29, 14 November 2005) at 130. The relationship between these criteria and the BIT 
definition of investment is not altogether clear. The cases give the strong impression that the two stages 
are separate and independent, thereby admitting the possibility of an alleged investment passing the 
BIT definition test, but failing on the Article 25 criteria. Bayindir 122; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v 
The Arab Republic of Egypt (Award on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/03/11, 6 
August 2004) at 48-50.  However, there is no unequivocal confirmation of this hierarchy between the 
two stages since the Article 25 criteria seem always to have confirmed the result of the first stage.  The 
present article does not comment further on these matters primarily because separate contributions can 
be foreseen in light of the recent Abaclat jurisdiction ruling. Abaclat v The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/07/05, 4 August 
2011) at 343-371; cf. Dissenting Opinion Professor George Abi-Saab 34-72. See, By Karen Halverson 
Cross,  ‘Investment Arbitration Panel Upholds Jurisdiction to Hear Mass Bondholder Claims against 
Argentina’ American Society of International Law Insight, 21 November 2011. 
By Karen Halverson Cross  
56 The recent Grand River Enterprises NAFTA Ch 11 claim provides an actual example of  this type of 
scenario as indicated by the following extract: ‘The Tribunal finds that it does not have jurisdiction 
over the claims of Kenneth Hill, Jerry Montour and Grand River, because they did not have an 
investment in the United States as defined by NAFTA. The evidence did not establish that these 
Claimants had constituted an enterprise in the United States or engaged in other significant activities 
there satisfying the definition of investment in Article 1139 of NAFTA. Instead, the record shows that, 
as relevant here, their activities centered on the manufacture of cigarettes at Grand River's 
manufacturing plant in Canada for export to the United States. The Tribunal concludes that such 
activities and investments by investors in the territory of one NAFTA party do not satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirements for a claim against another NAFTA party.’ Grand River Enterprises Six 
Nations Ltd. v U.S.A. (Award), 12 January 2011 at 5 with the tribunal discussing the matter at 80-122. 
57 This was a theme of Methanex’s Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award of 28 January 
2004. 
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When it came to elaborating on, and applying the legally significant connection test, 
the tribunal seized on ‘a measure of common ground’ between the US and Methanex. 
The parties agreed that the tribunal would have jurisdiction if the ban was motivated 
by the subjective intention to benefit the US ethanol industry, and to penalise foreign 
producers of methanol and MTBE.58 The tribunal found itself unable to reach a 
conclusion on this alleged intention without hearing evidence from the parties, rather 
than working from ‘a jigsaw of assumed facts and inferences’.59 Methanex was 
invited to submit a fresh pleading and Article 21(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, permitting a jurisdictional plea to be decided in the final award, was invoked.60  
 
This decision to combine the jurisdiction and merits decisions brought with it 
a problem which can be described in terms of ‘fit and compatibility’. In other words, 
deferring the jurisdiction decision created the need to ensure that the jurisdiction test 
was no stricter than those applicable in the merits. This was the main theme of 
Methanex’s request for reconsideration of the first partial award. As it is 
conventionally understood that national treatment obligations in trade and investment 
treaties such as NAFTA Article 1102 can be violated without any need to demonstrate 
intent to engage in nationality based discrimination,61 Methanex questioned how such 
a requirement could be imposed at the jurisdiction stage. It amounted to creating ‘a 
new requirement for proof of a national treatment violation’ previously unknown in 
NAFTA and other international jurisprudence.62 It is not inconceivable that the 
NAFTA Article 1102 jurisprudence will develop some kind of intent based approach, 
since there are valid arguments to the effect that national treatment obligations in 
investment treaties should be interpreted more strictly than in trade treaties.63 
However, it is surely beyond doubt that such a development should occur within the 
national treatment analysis, rather than within the ‘relating to’ language at the 
jurisdiction stage.64 In the aftermath of the first partial award, the question was 
therefore whether and how the tribunal would remedy the fit and compatibility 
problem. 
                                                 
58 Methanex (First Partial Award) 151-152. The intent alleged by Methanex was in the nature of the 
subjective intent of the then Governor of California, rather than objective intent derived from the 
overall structure, content and operation of challenged measures.  
59 Ibid. 167. 
60 This provision is now contained in Article 23(3) of the 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. Article 41(2) of the ICSID Convention provides for an equivalent provision.  
61 Methanex referred here to national treatment jurisprudence under NAFTA Chapter 12, Article 1202 
and GATT Article III both dealing with trade in goods. Request for Reconsideration of the Partial 
Award 17-18. Based on a review of the cases, DiMascio and Pauwelyn (above note XX) confirm that 
investment treaty national treatment violations can be established without needing to prove 
protectionist intent, viewing this as an aspect of convergence in the development of investment and 
trade law. (76-77) 
62 Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award 33. 
63 Di Mascio and Pauwelyn above note XX 53-58. The authors correctly do not envisage that 
investment tribunals should require evidence of subjective intent. This is an area where inspiration 
could be taken from the WTO Appellate Body’s approach of distinguishing between the ‘subjective 
intentions inhabiting the minds of individual legislators or regulators’ and the ‘objective expression in 
the statute itself’ as ‘discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a 
measure’. WT/DS87,110/AB/R Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 
62. 
64 In this regard, Methanex invoked generalia specialbus non derogant maxim of treaty interpretation 
as advising that ‘a specific provision controls a more general one as to the same subject matter’. It 
followed that ‘Article 1102’s specific focus removes the “matter” of national treatment and what it 
requires from the purview of Article 1101’. Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award, 28-32 .  
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The need for a solution in the case at hand would have been avoided if 
Methanex had been able to establish malign intent. This would have satisfied the 
jurisdiction test, and the subsequent finding of an Article 1102 national treatment 
violation would then have been a foregone conclusion – at least in practice if not in 
strict legal theory.65 The problem, of course, is that cases where malign intent can be 
established on the evidential record are few and far between.66 Methanex was a 
typical case in this respect since none of the claims of malign intent on the part of the 
then Governor of California could be substantiated.67  
 
A solution was therefore required to reconcile the jurisdiction and merits 
analyses. The first hint towards a solution was the tribunal’s statement in its Final 
Award that, ‘[t]here could be cases of a “legally significant connection” without … 
malign intent’.68 The solution was later revealed as the strong suggestion of an 
alignment of the ‘legally significant connection’ jurisdiction test, with the standards 
embodied in the substantive protections. Thus, if a violation of one or more of the 
substantive protections could be established, this could conceivably provide evidence 
relevant to a determination as to whether the “relation” required by NAFTA Article 
1101 exists’.69 The tribunal proceeded to the alleged violations of the substantive 
protections finding that none could be substantiated, so that Methanex’s case under 
Article 1101 was not assisted.70 Therefore, having considered and dismissed the 
alleged violations of the substantive protections, the tribunal concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to determine these claims.71  
 
C. Observations on the Methanex tribunal’s overall approach 
 
It can first be clarified that the argument is not that jurisdiction and merits 
phases must be separate and distinct. It is clear from the ICDID and UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules that tribunals have the discretion to join jurisdictional objections to 
the merits. At this level of generality, an argument could be made that the use of this 
discretion in Methanex was an entirely typical occurrence which can be observed in a 
significant proportion of investment cases. However, when the focus is on the extent 
to which matters of jurisdiction and merits were intertwined in Methanex, the case is 
                                                 
65 On this point, it is notable that the earlier Myers tribunal noted that ‘[t]he existence of an intent to 
favour nationals over non-nationals would not give rise to a breach of Chapter 1102 of the NAFTA if 
the measure in question were to produce no adverse effect on the non-national complainant’. (above 
note XX at 254). While correct, this statement is of little practical concern since cases of protectionist 
intent without adverse effect are vanishingly few. 
66 It is possible that the Myers case is a rare example. Within the national treatment analysis, the 
tribunal noted Canada’s concern ‘to ensure the economic strength of the Canadian industry, in part, 
because it wanted to maintain the ability to process PCBs within Canada in the future’. The 
maintenance of this ability was described as an ‘understandable’ ‘indirect motive’ thereby creating the 
strong inference that the direct motive was protectionism. (above note XX 234). 
67 Methanex (Final Award) 3 August 2005, Part III – Chapter B – page 27, Para. 60; Part IV – Chapter 
E – Pages 8-10 of Final Award. 
68 Ibid., Part II – Chapter E – Page 5, para. 8. As for why a more definitive analysis of Article 1101 had 
not been provided earlier in the proceedings, the tribunal relied on Methanex’s pleadings which had 
strongly focused on malign intent. 
69 Ibid., Part IV – Chapter B – Page 1, para. 1. 
70 Ibid.,Part IV – Chapter B – Page 19, para. 38; Part IV – Chapter C – Page 12, para. 27; Part IV – 
Chapter D – Page 8, para. 18. 
71 Ibid., Part IV – Chapter E – Page 10, para. 22. 
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atypical in investment jurisprudence. There are decisions which resemble Methanex to 
the extent that decisions on jurisdiction are deferred pending a full review of evidence 
presented in the merits.72 However, Methanex was not only such a case, but also one 
in which jurisdiction was declined on the basis that there were no substantive 
violations. In other words, it was a case in which jurisdiction and merits tests were 
conflated and, in this respect, the case may be unique.  
      
Based on this distinctive characteristic, an argument along the following lines 
can be advanced. If jurisdiction tests can be interpreted to avoid overlap with tests 
applicable in the merits without adverse consequences, then so much the better.73 A 
torrent of claims would certainly qualify as an adverse consequence and outweigh the 
value of a distinct boundary achieved by a test based on mere adverse impact. 
However, as argued above, there is ample protection against this danger outside of the 
‘relating to’ language. 
 
More fundamentally, the tribunal’s eventual compromise and retreat from 
malign intent as the jurisdiction test, led its analysis to fail on its own terms – the need 
for a ‘practical limitation’. A jurisdiction test which is very probably satisfied if there 
is a substantive violation does not control claims, and what some depict as the 
incursion of the investment law regime into the public regulatory sphere, any more 
than a test based on mere adverse impact. The analysis proceeds to the merits phase 
under both tests with the only difference being that, under the more lenient test, it is 
known that the tribunal has jurisdiction at the commencement of the merits phase.  
 
In sum, if ‘relating to’ requires a legally significant connection, this cannot 
mean malign intent because jurisdiction tests cannot be stricter than those applied in 
the merits. If, on the other hand, there is a legally significant connection when there is 
a substantive violation, this is no different in any practical sense from interpreting the 
‘relating to’ standard as requiring only adverse impact. The question therefore raised 
is whether there is any approach towards the ‘relating to’ standard as requiring a 
legally significant connection, to which these observations would not apply.  
 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TOWARDS THE ‘RELATING TO’ 
STANDARD AS REQUIRING A LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION  
 
Methanex did in fact suggest a possible alternative test. It submitted that it was 
targeted by the ban, because ‘…the measure had such a significant impact on 
Methanex that [it] should be treated as relating to Methanex and its investments in 
circumstances where the harm was foreseeable and direct’.74 This possible approach 
was not discussed in the case, with the most likely explanation being that Methanex 
                                                 
72 See, for example, Ioannis Kardassopoulos  v Republic of Georgia (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID 
Arbitral Tribunal) Case No. ARB/05/18, July 6, 2007)  paras. 253-261. 
73 Indeed, the Methanex tribunal seemed to recognize the value of a distinct boundary between the 
jurisdiction and merits phases at a fairly early stage of its analysis. Within an extensive discussion 
under the heading of ‘Jurisdiction: The Tribunal’s General Approach’, the tribunal noted:  ‘...there is no 
necessity at the jurisdictional stage for a definitive interpretation of the substantive provisions relied on 
by a claimant: the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal is established without the need for such 
interpretation. Indeed a final award on the merits where a NAFTA tribunal determines that the claimant 
has failed to prove its case within these substantive provisions cannot signify that the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction to make that award.’ First Partial Award, 121. 
74 Ibid, 132. 
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did not seem to present it as distinct from both the mere effect test, and the malign 
intent based test. The most appropriate inference is therefore that the tribunal did not 
detect that an intermediate approach had been advanced,75 rather than that this 
approach was rejected.  
 
A test along these lines is subject to the same criticism as the jurisdiction tests 
used in Methanex. The boundary between the jurisdiction and merits phases would 
remain blurred since findings about foreseeable and direct harm involves causation 
related analysis which is specifically provided for by Articles 1116 and 1117.76 (be 
careful with this – the Methanex tribunal describes 1116 as a jurisdiction clause 
at 120)There would again be problems of fit and compatibility in terms of needing to 
ensure that the rigour of the jurisdiction test did not exceed that of the merits test. 
Similarly, an insufficient evidential record would likely result in the joining of the 
jurisdiction and merits phases, with the tribunal declaring whether or not it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim, having completed the hearing of the claim.   
 
Indeed, these problems apply equally to any generally applicable test for 
revealing the existence of a legally significant connection. The question is what can 
give a connection between a measure and an investment the quality of being legally 
significant. In particular cases, the connection could be legally significant if the 
measure identifies the claimant by name, or if it is clear that the measure was directed 
towards and motivated by the claimant’s activities.77 However, these tests could not 
possibly exhaust the reach of a legally significant connection78 and, therefore, leave 
                                                 
75It is clear that ‘significant impact’ in the nature of ‘foreseeable and direct’ harm is a more difficult 
test to satisfy than mere effect. The distinction between malign intent and foreseeable and direct harm 
is a little less clear, since this harm can be presented as evidence towards establishing intent, which was 
probably what Methanex had in mind. However, the case was fundamentally about possible subjective 
malign intent on the part of the Governor of California. Harm which is objectively foreseeable can be 
present without any suggestion of subjective intent. It can therefore be seen how a ‘foreseeable and 
direct harm’ jurisdiction test could have been presented and analysed as an intermediate approach.   
76 These provisions refer to an investor or enterprise incurring ‘loss or damage, by reason of, or arising 
out of’ a substantive breach. 
77 The S.D. Myers arbitration is again illustrative here. According to the tribunal: ‘In this case, the 
requirement that the import ban be “in relation” to SDMI and its investment in Canada is easily 
satisfied. It was the prospect that SDMI would carry though with its plans to expand its Canadian 
operations that was the specific inspiration for the export ban. It was raised to address specifically the 
operations of SDMI and its investment.’ (Myers 234 Partial Award) 
78 This point has emerged from a number of the cases brought by investors against Argentina. An 
objection to jurisdiction has been raised in these cases to the effect that measures of general application 
not directed specifically at the claimants’ investments are not actionable. In advancing this objection, 
Argentina has relied on Methanex. Some tribunals have dismissed this reliance as irrelevant on the 
basis that the Methanex tribunal was interpreting NAFTA Article 1101 where the required nexus is 
between ‘measures’ and investments. In contrast, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention extends the 
Centre’s jurisdiction to ‘...any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’. However, some of 
the statements in these cases can be used to refute the suggestion that there can only be a ‘legally 
significant connection’ under NAFTA Article 1101 when the measures identify, or are directed towards 
the investments of claimants. Thus, Argentina’s objection to jurisdiction has been rejected on the basis 
that it ‘...would exclude from ICSID jurisdiction disputes caused by a governmental act of general 
expropriation while a governmental act expropriating a specific investment would be within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre’. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (Decision on jurisdiction) Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi Universal S.A., AWG Group Ltd. (UNCITRAL) 
(Claimants) v The Argentine Republic (Respondent) (August 3, 2006) para. 30.  This position is just as 
untenable under NAFTA Chapter 11 as it is under the BITs in question.  It is also interesting to note 
that, when applying ICSID Article 25, Argentina’s objection has always been rejected with reference to 
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the question of what a generally applicable test might look like. All one can say here 
is that the need for a legally significant connection seems to envisage the making of a 
legal determination, as opposed to the more factually oriented determination of 
whether the measure has affected the investment. However, this begs the question of 
what legal determination could be made at the jurisdiction stage, which would not 
bring forward analysis required in the merits.  
 
The same observation then re-surfaces. If, under the legally significant 
connection test, it is not known whether there is jurisdiction to hear a claim until the 
hearing of the claim is completed, then the test is the functional and practical 
equivalent of a jurisdiction test based on mere effect. Both tests have the same 
implications in terms of controlling the volume of claims and of responding to what 
some commentators present as the incursion of the investment regime into the public 
regulatory sphere.  
 
The illusiveness of a distinct legal determination at the jurisdiction stage 
which would not bring forward the merits analysis can be illustrated with analogies to 
WTO law. In the investment context, the argument under Article 1101 is that the 
challenged measure does not relate to investment because it is primarily directed 
towards the regulation of goods or services. Something approaching the mirror image 
of this argument can be seen in a number of WTO disputes in which it has been 
argued that the challenged measure does not apply directly to goods or services, but 
rather to enterprises which engage in trade. For example, in Korea – Beef,79 the dual-
retail system did not apply directly to beef, but rather to sellers of beef who, for the 
most part, had to choose between selling domestic or imported beef. The argument is 
that the measure is directed towards traders (rather than goods or the importation of 
goods) and that the WTO legal system does not seek to regulate the choices of traders 
and consumers. Panels and the Appellate Body have implicitly assessed whether there 
is a sufficient connection between the challenged measures and trade in goods by 
simply asking whether the measures violate the terms of the treaty protections. The 
generality of this approach is shown by following passage from the Appellate Body 
report in China – Audiovisual: 
 
‘…measures that did not directly regulate goods, or the importation of 
goods, have nonetheless been found to contravene GATT obligations. Thus, 
for example, restrictions imposed on investors, wholesalers, and 
manufacturers, as well as on points of sale and ports of entry, have been 
                                                                                                                                            
a passage from CMS v Argentina:  ‘[w]hat is brought under the jurisdiction of the Centre is not the 
general measures in themselves but the extent to which they may violate those specific commitments 
[given to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts]. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Republic 
of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (July 
17, 2003) para. 27. Other tribunals which might similarly have rejected reliance on Methanex on the 
basis that it was interpreting a NAFTA provision, have been prepared to engage with the decision. In 
particular, while the BG Group case was decided under the Argentina – UK BIT, whose coverage 
under Article 8(1) extends to ‘disputes with regard to an investment’, the tribunal nevertheless provided 
its views on why Methanex was a misinterpretation of NAFTA. It also refused to apply Methanex to 
the matter before it on the basis that it ‘...would discharge Argentina of its BIT obligations simply 
because its measures do not, on their face, target any investor, and it would render the promises used to 
attract foreign investment meaningless’. Again, this is a generally applicable statement. Final Award in 
the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration BG Group Plc. (Claimant) v Argentine Republic 
(Respondent) (December 24, 2007) paras. 219-233. 
79 WT/DS161,169/AB/R Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef. 
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found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 or Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947 
or 1994’80  
 
A possible response is that WTO tribunals have no choice other than to adopt this 
approach of proceeding directly to the question of whether there is a substantive 
violation. This is because the WTO dispute settlement process does not envisage 
distinct jurisdiction and merits phases.81 However, there is at least one example in the 
WTO legal texts of a provision which strongly resembles NAFTA Article 1101. 
Article 1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) provides 
that it ‘applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only’. While this 
provision has not been interpreted in terms of imposing a separate jurisdiction test, it 
raises two questions which are analogous to the Article 1101 nexus requirement. First, 
when is a measure an investment measure? Secondly, when does an investment 
measure relate to trade in goods?  
 
The leading statements on these questions are provided by the panel in Indonesia 
– Autos.82 The measures at issue here included tariff benefits for imported parts and 
components used in cars incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic 
products.83 
 
On the first question, it was not necessary for the panel to explore the full scope 
of the term ‘investment measure’. The text of the measures revealed to the panel that 
they were clearly ‘aimed at encouraging the development of a local manufacturing 
capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and components in Indonesia’. As 
such, the panel considered that they would ‘necessarily have a significant impact on 
investment in these sectors’ and that the measure would, ‘fall within any reasonable 
interpretation of the term “investment measures”’. Nevertheless, the panel’s further 
statements indicate that it was inclined towards a broad interpretation. Thus it noted 
the possibility of ‘other measures which qualify as investment measures ... because 
they relate to investment in a different manner’.84 Indonesia’s view that the measures 
could not be regarded as investment measures because the government did not regard 
the programmes as such was also rejected.85 Therefore, the possible view that 
                                                 
80 The Appellate Body noted as follows in WT/DS363/AB/R China – Measures Affecting Trading 
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products:. 
(para. 227 notes omitted). 
81 Despite the absence of separate jurisdiction and merits phases, respondent states frequently raise 
objections to the jurisdiction of panels and a number of DSU provisions have been identified as 
relevant to the authority of panels to hear disputes and adjudicate on specific aspects of disputes. Of 
particular note in terms of Appellate Body engagement with panel jurisdiction is WT/DS308/AB/R 
Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages 40-57. There does not appear to be an 
example of the Appellate Body having overruled a positive finding of jurisdiction by a panel. 
82 WT/DS54, 55, 59, 64/R  Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry adopted 
23 July 1998. 
83 Given the nature of these measures as local content requirements and as therefore clearly falling 
under the Illustrative List of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the GATT Article III:4 and XI, it is 
possible (and probably likely) that no initial and separate engagement is required with whether the 
measures are in fact TRIMs. However, as the panel in Indonesia – Autos noted, it is also possible that 
‘...the TRIMs Agreement requires a separate analysis of the nature of a measure as a trade-related 
investment measure before proceeding to an examination of whether the measure is covered by the 
Illustrative List’. (14.71) 
84 Ibid. 14.80. 
85 Ibid. 14.81. 
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investment measures under the TRIMs agreement are measures which, to any extent, 
affect investment has not been excluded.  
 
The panel’s brief consideration of the second question under TRIMs Article I is a 
more direct analogy to NAFTA Article 1101, by reason of the ‘related to’ 
requirement:  
 
We now have to determine whether these investment measures are ‘trade-
related’. We consider that, if these measures are local content requirements, 
they would necessarily be ‘trade-related’ because such requirements, by 
definition, always favour the use of domestic products over imported 
products, and therefore affect trade.86  
 
Therefore, investment measures are ‘related to trade in goods’ when they affect trade 
in goods, rather than when there is a legally significant connection.  
 
It would be wrong to present these analogies with WTO law as dispositive of 
how the ‘relating to’ standard should be interpreted in investment law. Indeed, the 
analogy might be refuted with reference to the differences between the trade and 
investment regimes noted above. As Diebold writes, ‘investment treaties are designed 
to protect the value of a specific investment, whereas international trade law protects a 
more abstract value of equal conditions of competition’.87 Attributing significant 
weight to this idea could lead to the call for a close connection between the measure 
and the investment; closer than the connection between a measure and goods / 
services in the trade regime. As has been argued, however, the connection in the 
investment context cannot be so close as to be satisfied only if the claimant is 
identified by name, or if it is clear that the measure was directed towards and 
motivated by the claimant’s activities. It has also been demonstrated that interpreting 
the ‘relating to’ standard as requiring anything more than mere effect is problematic. 
The final section now turns to whether the problems might be offset by countervailing 
advantages.  
 
 
VI. ARE THERE ANY VALID REASONS FOR INTERPRETING THE 
‘RELATING TO’ STANDARD AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN MERE EFFECT?  
 
The advantages of interpreting the Article 1101 ‘relating to’ standard as requiring 
only that measures affect the investment have now been explained. The test is capable 
of application in a clear and consistent manner. It seems unrealistic to associate the 
test with an opening of the floodgates and it is does not blur the boundary between the 
jurisdiction and merits analysis thereby raising the fit and compatibility issue. Is there 
anything of substance which can be placed in the opposite side of the balance in 
favour of a stricter interpretation? On this question, there is a need to comment further 
on Afilalo’s contribution. 
 
As noted, the author bestows the ‘relating to’ requirement with the task of 
distinguishing between government measures which should be subject to review in 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 14.82. 
87 Diebold above note XX at 844. 
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the trade law regime, and measures which might also be reviewed as possible 
violations of the investment law regime. His view is that measures which advance a 
non-protectionist objective should not be regarded as satisfying this requirement. In 
other words, there should be an insufficient nexus between the challenged measures 
and investment if the measures are explicable on the basis of a non-protectionist 
objective. In these circumstances, as later argued by the US in Methanex, the effect of 
the measures on the investment is ‘incidental’ to the legitimate regulatory purpose. 
 
If it were not possible in investment disputes to sufficiently consider 
regulatory purpose anywhere other than as a jurisdiction test under the ‘relating to’ 
language, Afilalo’s suggested approach would have to be accepted. The alternative of 
interpreting Article 1101 as requiring mere effect would be inadequate to control what 
could then be accurately depicted as the incursion of the investment law regime into 
the public regulatory sphere. 
 
 The debate about considering regulatory purpose when appraising government 
measures is less well developed in the investment context than the trade context, but 
arguably of greater importance. This is not only because of the individualization of 
claims, but also because most BITs, in common with NAFTA Chapter 11, do not 
presently incorporate a general exceptions provision comparable to GATT Article 
XX.88 In the trade context, a strong argument can be made that dispute settlement 
panels should not decide whether products are ‘like’ or whether there is ‘less 
favourable treatment’ without considering the underlying purpose of the challenged 
measures.89 However, even if regulatory purpose is overlooked in the ‘primary 
violation’ analysis, respondent states are permitted to invoke the exception provisions 
in a second stage of the overall appraisal. For the most part, in investment disputes, 
the aim of the measure must either be considered when interpreting the substantive 
protections, or not at all – unless, of course, a strong role is attributed to the ‘relating 
to’ jurisdiction standard.   
 
  Encouragingly, the emerging literature gives the impression of considerable 
scope for engagement with regulatory purpose within the confines of the substantive 
protections. DiMascio and Pauwelyn note that ‘every major interpretation of the “in 
like circumstances” or “in like situations” language in the national treatment 
provisions of investment agreements has rejected the trade law emphasis on alteration 
of the conditions of competition in favour of a test that focuses on whether an alleged 
discrimination is effectively based upon nationality rather than some other policy 
                                                 
88 On the growing trend towards incorporating general exceptions provisions, see Suzanne A. Spears 
‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements 13 Journal 
of International Economic Law (2010) 1037 at 1059-1062. 
89 Robert Hudec, ‘GATT / WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aims and 
Effects Test” 32(3) The International Lawyer  (1998)  619; D. Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like 
Products” in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2)’ 36(3) Journal of 
World Trade (2002) 44; Donald Regan, ‘Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under 
Article III of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ 37(4) Journal of World Trade (2003) 737; 
Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Still Hazy After all These Years: The Interpretation of National 
Treatment in the GATT / WTO Case-law on Tax Discriminaiton’ 15 European Journal of International 
Law (2004) 39; J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness’ in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl 
and Pierre Sauvé (eds.) GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) Chapter 15.  
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reason’.90 Other authors have identified scope for engagement with regulatory 
purpose in protections other than national treatment. Voon and Mitchell focus on the 
prospects of investor claims against Australia’s tobacco plain packaging measures. 
Based on an extensive review of the jurisprudence and literature, their view is that the 
public health dimension underpinning the new measures would play a strong role in 
the rejection of the possible expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims.91   
 
 Therefore, regulatory purpose can either be considered at the jurisdiction stage 
when applying the ‘relating to’ standard, or it can be considered within the merits 
analysis when applying the substantive protections. When choosing between these 
options, the most relevant consideration may be that engagement with regulatory 
purpose is among the more sensitive aspects of the overall appraisal of measures. The 
idea that government measures which are challenged in the trade and investment 
regime should not be condemned if they advance a non-protectionist objective is 
simply stated and generally accepted. However, a careful analysis is required before a 
conclusion can be reached with any degree of confidence. This is understandably so 
bearing in mind the sensitivity of the measures under review, and the opprobrium of 
infringement findings from which a reasonable inference of nationality based 
discrimination can be drawn. It is perhaps unrealistic to consider that this analysis can 
be completed to the satisfaction of the parties at the jurisdiction stage.92 Put 
differently, the extent to which regulatory purpose goes to the very essence of the 
dispute means that this matter gravitates strongly towards the terms of the substantive 
protections, rather than towards the ‘relating to’ standard in Article 1101.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has considered an aspect of the relationship between the investment and 
trade regimes which is most frequently discussed with reference to NAFTA Article 
1101. The central question has been how we should think about government measures 
which are plainly capable of review in the intergovernmental trade regime, and which 
also affect the economic interests of investors and their investments. Is there any 
compelling need to develop an interpretation of the Article 1101 ‘relating to’ standard 
which precludes or limits the review of such measures in the investment regime? 
 
The article has argued that, provided the existence of an investment is 
confirmed, and provided the government measures at issue affect the economic 
interests of that investment, the appraisal of these measures can safely proceed to the 
merits. This position should hold even if the measures are also plainly capable of 
review in the intergovernmental trade regime. In these circumstances, the concept of a 
boundary between the two regimes can and should be refuted. 
 
                                                 
90 Above note XX at 76. The consideration of regulatory purpose in investment disputes is also 
discussed at various points by Diebold above note XX. 
91 Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell, ‘Time to Quit? Assessing International Investment Claims 
Against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia’ 14(3) Journal of International Economic Law (2011) 
515 at 532-536.  
92 The solution which may well be implicit in Afilalo’s contribution is to delay the decision on 
jurisdiction until the completion of the merits. That this solution can be likened to ‘opening a can of 
worms’ is shown by the analysis of Methanex which has been provided. 
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This position is supported by three arguments. First, there is no strong 
evidence in the NAFTA Treaty of a general presumption that measures capable of 
review under a non-investment chapter are insulated from review under the 
investment chapter. The reliance by respondent states on the Article 1112(1) conflict 
clause, under which inconsistencies between the investment chapter and other 
chapters must be resolved in favour of the latter, is misplaced. Secondly, it does not 
appear to be possible to develop a workable conception of the Article 1101 ‘relating 
to’ standard as requiring anything more than adverse impact. The now prevailing 
‘legally significant connection’ test should be abandoned. The presence of such a 
connection cannot possibly be exhausted either when the measures at issue take the 
form of laws and regulations, or when a reasonable assumption can be made that the 
measures were motivated by the claimant’s specific investment activities. Possible 
alternative conceptions of ‘relating to’ as ‘legally significant connection’ share the 
problem of prematurely considering legal matters which should be deferred to the 
merits. In turn, the problem then becomes one of ‘fit and compatibility’ in terms of 
ensuring that the jurisdiction standard is no stricter than those applicable in the merits. 
The third argument is the absence of a consideration which can be placed in the 
opposite side of the balance in favour of a strict jurisdiction test which would operate 
to shift the review of measures towards the trade regime. Considerable weight would 
need to be attributed to a lack of scope for considering regulatory purpose within the 
substantive protections. However, the significant extent of this scope is a recurring 
theme of the emerging literature. 
 
As a closing thought, it is important to point out that this article does not seek 
to refute all aspects of a boundary between the trade and investment regimes. As has 
been discussed, if we change the facts of cases like Cargill and Methanex by 
removing the enterprises in the host states, the effect would most likely be to remove 
the existence of any investment. The measures at issue in these cases would then only 
be capable of review in the trade regime and it would be entirely appropriate to think 
in terms of a reasonably bright line demarcating the two regimes. However, there is 
no need for any demarcation if the existence of an investment is confirmed and there 
are government measures which affect the economic interests of the investment. 
 
 
   
 
  
 
